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the result in the Wiley case is sound. But if Yates is strictly limited to
cases where Congress has not fixed the statutory limits within which the
district judge must confine his sentence, then Wiley has erroneously extended the power of the court of appeals. Furthermore, in view of the
fact that the court based its decision to a strong extent upon the disparity
of the defendants' sentences, Wiley, if it is to be considered stare decisis,
must be limited to those cases involving multiple defendants only. In either event, there is a strong possibility that Wiley v. United States will
be sui generis.
Many legal writers have favorably advocated appellate review of sentencing and have outlined their formulae for its eventual inception.8 5 But
if Congress is to adopt a system which entitles the court of appeals
to review the sentence imposed by the district court, it is suggested
that it should do so only upon the following terms: (1) There should be
no review unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown; and (2) If an abuse
of discretion does exist, it should be disclosed by every factor which the
trial court had at its disposal, namely: the complete record as evidenced
by the trial transcript, any pre-sentencing reports, and confidential investigative reports. An accompanying written explanation of the factors motivating the judge in sentencing might also be included. It is submitted that
only under these circumstances can a proper, intelligent review be accomplished.
8o McGuire & Holtzoff, The Problem of Sentence in the Criminal Law, 20

B.U.L.

REV. 423 (1940); ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939).

THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY
As unbelievable as it would, no doubt, seem to our founding fathers,
the boundaries of the states were not fully determined until June 15,
1960-more than one-hundred eighty years after this country had declared its independence of England. The reason for this anomaly was a
belated realization on the part of the United States that perhaps it, and not
the coastal states, owned the lands submerged beneath the marginal sea.
With the birth of this realization, the United States began to actively
pursue a program intended to bring these valuable lands within its jurisdiction, and thereby came into existence the dispute commonly termed
the Tidelands Oil Controversy.'
Although it was oil which precipitated the struggle, the interests involved were much more valuable than the "black gold" resting beneath
I Technically, the tidelands is that area of land situated between high-water and lowwater marks. In the Tidelands Oil Controversy, it refers to the lands lying beyond the

low-water mark and extending out to the continental shelf.
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the ocean bottom for, if the littoral states were not declared the owners
of the marginal sea, then who would be allowed to exploit its vast wealth?
Further, what would be the status of the numerous facilities built by the
states and the many improvements which they had made in the offshore
waters? The obvious answer spurred the coastal states to action and resulted in a long and bitter battle fought both in Congress and the Supreme
Court. As one might expect, a controversy extending over two decades
has numerous highpoints, but in this dispute there are three events which
take precedence over all others; (1) United States v. California,' The
Submerged Lands Act of 19533 and, (3)
United States v. Louisiana,
4
Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
UNITED STATES V. CALIFORNIA

Prior to the 1930's, there was no dispute over the ownership of the
off-shore lands, 5 the states assuming that they owned the lands situated
beneath the marginal sea, and the Federal Government not challenging
this assumption. That the United States had never asserted ownership of
lands lying beyond low-water mark is evident from a historical study of
Congressional action, such action being necessary in order for a territory
acquired by the United States to become an integral part thereof.6 However, on April 15, 1937, Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota introduced
a bill which, for the first time, directed the attention of Congress to the
7
heretofore unrecognized question.
During this early period of the dispute, Congress, in the main, favored
state ownership of the submerged lands but, for various reasons was unable to enact legislation which would have affirmed ownership in the
coastal states. It was this inability to act which enabled the United States
to assert that it, and not the littoral states, was entitled to the minerals
lying beneath the soils of the marginal sea. Rather than choose as its initial
opponent one of the coastal states, the United States preferred to file suit
against the Pacific Western Oil Company which leased from California
lands situated beneath the marginal sea. 8 By determining the rights of the
lessee, the United States would, in effect, also determine California's title
to the controverted area, for the rights of the lessee would be dependent
2 332 U.S. 19 (1947).

3 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (Supp. 1959).
4 80 S. Ct.961 (1960).

.5
Ibid.
6 Dorr

v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1903).

7 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1385 (1953).
8 United States v. Pacific Western Oil Corp., U.S.D.C. for Southern District of California (filed 1945).
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upon title residing in California. The United States, however, decided to
discontinue this suit and engage as its adversary its true opponentCalifornia. The United States complaint as quoted by the Court alleged
that the United States "is the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of
paramount rights in and powers over, the lands, minerals and other things
of value underlying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary low
water mark on the coast of California and outside of the inland waters of
the State, extending seaward three nautical rAiles and bounded on the
north and south, respectively, by the northern and southern boundaries
of the State of California."'9 The United State then prayed for a decree
declaring its rights to be superior or "paramount" to the rights of California in the marginal sea and for the issuance of an injunction against
California and those persons claiming thereunder.
The Supreme Court, rather than analyzing the contentions of the
United States, preferred to devote its energies to destroying the arguments presented by the California brief. By so doing, the Court was able
to ignore the United States' claim of ownership, a claim which would be
difficult to sustain in the absence of Congressional legislation, and decide
the case upon the doctrine of "paramount rights." Further, by adopting
such a position, the Court practically insured the United States of success
in subsequent litigation which it intended to initiate against the remaining
coastal states for, in destroying the arguments of California, it also destroyed the basic arguments relied upon by the other littoral states.
The first two arguments advanced by California were of a technical
nature and were handled by the Court in a cursory fashion. California
contended that the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to entertain
the suit because there was no controversy and, secondly, the Attorney
General of the United States was without authority to initiate this particular suit because Congress had never manifested its intent to bring suit
against the states. As to the first contention, the Court (the majority
opinion by Justice Black) said that this was a controversy in the classic
sense, and therefore the Court had jurisdiction under article III, section
2, of the United States Constitution.'0 As to the second assertion, the
Court held that Congress had never revoked the authority it had conferred upon the Attorney General to initiate suit to protect the rights
and interests of the United States. 1'
With the defeat of these two technical contentions, the Supreme Court
then addressed itself to the heart of California's position. The argument
9 332 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1947).
10 "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases.... to which the United States shall
he a party."
I15 U.S.C.A. § 291, 309 (1926).
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may be presented in the following three-fold arrangement: (1) The original Constitution adopted by California prior to its admission into the
Union, placed its boundaries three English miles from the shore; 12 (2) the
enabling statute which admitted California into the Union ratified the
boundary thus established;1 3 and, (3) California was admitted on an equal
footing with the original states in all respects. California then concluded
that, these premises being true, the State of California must be declared
the owner of the marginal sea on the basis of the long established rule
4
announced in Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan.1
In order to fully appreciate California's theory of ownership, it is necessary to consider in greater detail the phrase "equal footing" and the
case of Pollard's Lessee. After having established its independence of
England, the young Republic adopted the Articles of Confederation
(March, 1781). Perhaps the greatest success scored by the government of
Confederation, which government proved to be weak and ineffectual, was
the manner in which it settled the problem created by the unsettled lands
west of the Alleghenies. The government of Confederation "decided to
open them [the unsettled lands] to orderly and progressive settlement; to
encourage the inhabitants to develop self government by regular stages;
and, finally, to erect new states, similar in powers to the original thirteen."' 5 The principles upon which these new states were to be formed
were embodied within the NORTHVEST ORDINANCE.' 6 The term "equal
footing" appears in article I, section 12 of that document and again in
Article 5, the latter article providing: "And whenever any of the said
states shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants, therein, such state shall
be admitted by its delegates into the Congress of the United States, on
an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever....

,,17

The import of this provision upon the later history of the states is best
indicated by the fact that, with the exception of Texas, 18 it appears that
every enabling statute admitting subsequent states into the Union contained it. 10
12 CAL. CONST. art. 12, 5 I.

1:'9 Stat. 452 (1850).

14 44 U.S. (3 -low.) 212 (1845).

1' NEVINS & COMMAGER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 114 (1942).
16 CRAVEN, JOHNSON & DUNN, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF "rieAMERICAN

PEOPLE 172

(1951).
17 Id. at 175. (Emphasis added.)
I" The joint resolution for annexing Texas contained three sections and, of the three,
only section 3 referred to the "equal footing" provision. 5 Stat. 797 (1845). Texas, by
joint resolution, accepted the annexation proposal of the United States exclusive of 3.
2 GAMMEL's LAWS OF TEXAS 1225 (1845).
19 E.g., The acts admitting Alabama, 3 Stat. 608 (1819), Mississippi, 3 Star. 472 (1817),
and California, 9 Star. 452 (1850), contained such provisions,
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A fine cxauiple of the "equal footing" provision in action is the Pollard
case. Stated briefly, the facts of that case were as follows: Pollard brought
an action in ecjctment against the defendant, Hagan. Pollard had been
granted lands situated beneath Mobile Bay, an inland bay, by the United
States subsequent to the admission of Alabama into the Union; Hagen's
title was based upon an old Spanish land grant. The enabling statute admitting Alabama into the Union contained a provision which purported
to reserve to the United States all the waste and unappropriated lands
lying within the boundaries of Alabama. Pollard asserted that these lands,
being waste lands, came within the ambit of this provision and, therefore,
he was entitled to the lands by virtue of the patent conveying the lands
to him by the United States. The Court, in denying this assertion, pointed
out that the enabling statute admitting Alabama into the Union also contained an "equal footing" provision. Justice McKinley, who wrote the
opinion of the Court, then quoted Justice Taney's famous statement from
Martin v. Waddell:20 "When the Revolution took place, the people of
each State became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for
their own common use, subject only to the rights surrendered by the
Constitution." 21 Justice McKinley incorporated into one rule the holding
of the Martin case and the principle established by the "equal footing"
provision of the Northwest Ordinance.Justice McKinley concluded that,
the original thirteen states owning the soils situated beneath their navigable waters and Alabama having been admitted into the Union on an equal
footing with the original thirteen states in all respects, it was Alabama
which held title to the controverted lands beneath Mobile Bay and that
these rights could be neither enlarged nor diminished by a compact between Alabama and the United States. Therefore, because the United
States did not possess title to the lands beneath Mobile Bay, the patent
conveying these lands to Pollard was a nullity.
Although the marginal sea was navigable, Justice Black refused to apply
the rule of the Pollard case. He distinguished that case from the present
case by pointing out that the factual situation presented by the Pollard
decision and all subsequent holdings which applied the rule announced
in that case, revolved around lands submerged beneath inland waters,
concluding that an extension of the rule of Pollard's Lessee would be unwarranted. He further distinguished the two cases by denying that the
original thirteen states had ever owned the "tidelands"; whereas, they had
and did own the soils submerged beneath the inland waters. Justice
Black's conclusion was premised upon the fact that, at the time of the
2044 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
1

.d.at 229.
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revolution, the concept of the marginal sea was only a "nebulous suggestion," and therefore the original thirteen states could not have owned
22
the "tidelands."
The Court next considered three cases which it felt lent some credence
to the claims of California: (1) Manchester v. Massachusetts;2 3 (2) Louisiana v. Mississippi24 and, (3) The Abby Dodge.25 Justice Black held the
first two cases to be inapplicable to the factual situation presented by the
present case, the Manchester case involving inland waters, and the Louisiana case having as litigants two states rather than a state and the Federal
Government. The Court found it more difficult to rationalize The Abby

Dodge. The facts of that case are as follows: A federal statute prohibited
the landing and subsequent sale in any United States port of sponge taken
by means of diving equipment in the "Gulf of Mexico or the Straits of
Florida. '26 The United States instituted action against the Abby Dodge, a
fishing vessel, alleging a violation of the statute. In the complaint, the
United States did not allege that the Abby Dodge was taking sponge outside Florida's three-mile coastal limit. In dismissing the action, the Supreme Court declared that the statute applied only to waters beyond
Florida's seaward boundary,27 and to construe the statute otherwise
would render it unconstitutional. In denying the application of The Abby
Dodge, Justice Black stated:
But the opinion in that case was concerned with the state's power to regulate
and conserve within its territorial waters, not with its exercise of the right to
use and deplete resources which might be of national and international importance. And there was no argument there, nor did this Court decide, whether
the Federal Government owned or had paramount rights in the soil under the
Gulf waters. That this question remained undecided in evidenced by Skiriotes
v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 .... where we had occasion
to speak of Florida's power
28
over sponge fishing in its territorial waters.

Justice Black then directed himself to the final argument he considered
worthy of noting-i.e., that California, by the doctrines of estoppel, laches,
and adverse possession, had acquired ownership of the Tidelands. The
Court, although admitting that many acts of the Federal Government
tended to substantiate the theory advanced by California, held that the
above doctrines could not be invoked to deprive the United States of
public lands which it held in trust for the people, regardless of the neg22 But see BARTLUY, TiE
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15-17 (1953).

23

139 U.S. 240 (1891).

2-5
223 U.S. 166 (1912).

24

202 U.S. 1 (1906).

26,34 Stat. 312 (1906).

"I The Court, in the light of United States v. Louisiana, 80 S.Ct. 961 (1960), erroneously stated that Florida's seaward boundary extended three miles into the sea.
28

332 U.S. 19, 37-38 (1947).
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ligent manner in which its agents administered that trust. With the destruction of this final argument, the Court concluded:
[V]e decide for the reasons we have stated that California is not the owner
of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt,
an incident to which is full
dominion over the resources of the soil under that
9
water area, including oil.2
The success of the United States in the California case did not auger
well for the remaining coastal states since their theories of ownership
were so closely akin to those advanced by California. In fact, their only
hope of retaining possession of the marginal sea rested in the hands of a
powerless Congress.80 Before Congress could enact legislation affirming
title in the littoral states of the "tidelands," the United States filed suit
against the states of Louisiana and Texas. 1
As to Louisiana, the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas writing the majority opinion, held the decision in the California case controlling. The
status of Texas was unique in that she had once been an independent nation. This, however, did not deter Justice Douglas. Ironically, the means
used by Justice Douglas to destroy any title which Texas may have possessed in the marginal sea prior to her admission into the union, was that
argument upon which the coastal states relied so heavily-the "equal footing" provision. The Court stated that Texas, having been admitted into
the Union upon an "equal footing" with her sister states in all respects,
relinquished such title as she may have possessed in the marginal sea, for
the "equal footing" clause demands not only that the rights of a state entering into the Union be no less than those states already a member
thereof, but also, that they be no greater.3 2 Also interesting to note in the
Louisiana case is the fact that the Court spells out the doctrine of "paramount powers" which Justice Black had hinted at in the California case.
The Court states:
As we pointed out in United States v. California, the issue in this class of
litigation does not turn on title or ownership in the conventional sense. California, like the thirteen original colonies, never acquired ownership in the marginal sea. The claim to our three-mile belt was first asserted by the national
government. Protection and control of the area are indeed functions of national
external sovereignty. . . . The marginal sea is a national, not a state concern.
•'PId. at 38-39.
30 A further discussion of the powerless position of Congress during this period is
contained under the subtopic entitled "Submerged Lands Act" in this paper.
31 The status of the boundaries of Texas and Louisiana was not decided until 1950,
while the Submerged Lands Act was enacted in 1953.
3
a',The Court later amended United States v. Texas, 340 U.S. 848 (1950), striking out
the phrase "equal footing" wherever it appeared. See note 18 supra.
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National interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The
problems of commerce, national defense, relations with other powers, war and33
peace focus there. National rights must therefore be paramount in that area.
The doctrine, although new in name, is probably not an extension of the
Federal power; rather, the Supreme Court has simply placed a label upon
the aggregate powers possessed by the Federal Government. Further, as
indicated by the Submerged Lands Act, 34 the United States probably
could exercise these powers in the marginal sea whether or not title to
3
the "tidelands" rested in the littoral states.
THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT

While the battle between the coastal states and the United States was
raging in the Supreme Court, Congress also was manifesting an intense
interest in this controversial question-ownership of the marginal sea.
Congress, however, unlike the Executive Department, preferred to affirm
state ownership of the "tidelands" or, if the states possessed no title, to
quitclaim such title as the United States possessed in the marginal sea to
the coastal states. That the United States lacked a proprietary interest in
the marginal sea presented no problem because, in declaring itself owner,
Congress would be performing an act of a political nature. Since the Supreme Court refuses to take jurisdiction of disputes where the subject
matter of such dispute is of a political nature, 36 the United States' ownership of the "tidelands" could not be questioned. Then, under article IV,
section 3 (2) of the Constitution,37 the United States could grant the
"tidelands" to the littoral states.
As was earlier pointed out, the problem was first indicated in Congress
in 1937. It wasn't however, until 1945 that those favoring the quitclaiming of the marginal sea to the states were able to gain sufficient support to
pass such a bill through the House and Senate.38 The bill was vetoed by
33 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950).
34 43 U.S.C.A. § 1314 (a) (1953) provides: "The United States retains all its naviga-

tional servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and
navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but shall not be
deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources which are
specifically recognized, confirmed established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States and others by section 1311 of this title."
35 But see BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS CONTROVERSY, 247-273 (1957).
36
South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
37 "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of... Property belonging to the United
States."
38 92 CONG. REC. 10469 (1945).
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President Truman.3 9 With the knowledge that President Truman would
remain in office until 1952, and being unable to override his veto by the
necessary two-thirds vote, 40 Congress was forced to remain idly by and
observe the defeats of the coastal states in the Supreme Court. Then, in
1952, General Eisenhower was elected President and, with the threat of a
Presidential veto removed, Congress quickly enacted the Submerged
41
Lands Act of 1953.
The act quitclaims the soils situated beneath the marginal sea, including
the minerals residing thereunder, to the coastal states and gives to each of
them the right to extend their boundary three miles out into the marginal sea from low-water mark. 42 Section 1301 (3) (b) provides that "in
no event ... shall the . . . boundaries ...[extend] more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean, or more than three marine
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico." This provision, when taken in conjunction with the portion of section 1312 which reads,
Nothing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in any manner
prejudicing the existence of any State's seaward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution or laws prior to or at
the time such state became
a member of the Union, or if it has been heretofore
43
approved by Congress,
would seem to indicate that Congress considered the Supreme Court decision in the Texas case as an unjust one and, therefore, intended to rectify the injustice. The truth of this theory is indicated by the following
facts: Texas asserted that its boundary extended three marine leagues into
the Gulf of Mexico; 44 section 1301 (3) (b) refers specifically to the Gulf
of Mexico, the location of the Texas claims; and the Texas case was decided shortly before the Submerged Lands Act.
UNITED STATES V. LOUISIANA

By merely glancing at the aforequoted provisions of the Submerged
Lands Act (sections 1301 (3) (b) and 1312), one could readily perceive
that one of the consequences of the act would be further litigation be:"'
U.S. CODe CONG. & AD.NEws 1712 (1946). President Truman stated: "It [the issue]
thus presents a legal question of great importance to the Nation, and one which should
be decided by the Court."
4192 CONG. REc. 10660 (1946).
41

In Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954), the Supreme Court denied Alabama and

Rhode Island leave to file bills of complaint challenging the act, holding that the disposition of public lands is for Congress to determine and not the Supreme Court.
U.S.C.A. §§ 1311-12 (Supp. 1959).
U.S.C.A. § 1312 (Supp. 1959).
44 As earlier pointed out, Texas, after it declared its independence of Mexico, established its boundaries as extending three leagues out into the Gulf of Mexico.
4243

4343
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tween the United States and the coastal states in order to ascertain who
was entitled to the lands lying between the three-mile water mark and
three marine leagues. Once again, it was the United States which initiated
suit against the coastal states, this time choosing as an adversary Louisiana.
The United States then ordered the suit to be broadened to include the
45
states of Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.
The first difficulty encountered by the Court was the meaning of the
phrase "prior to or at the time," the language of section 1312. After denying the interpretations advanced by the United States and California, 4
the Court held that because the statute was inconclusive upon its face, it
would be necessary to consult the legislative history. (Although the court
does not make clear the legislative history to which it is referring, it is
obvious that it means the admission history of the states into the Union.)
The Court, in a quandary, adopted the rule of Pollard's Lessee which, in
the California case, they had held inapplicable to the marginal sea. The
phrase was, therefore, construed to mean the boundary of the state when
the state was admitted into the Union.
Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion, considered first the
claims of Texas. The Texas legislature, in 1836, defined its boundaries as
"beginning at the mouth of the Sabine river, and running west along the
Gulf of Mexico three leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande,
thence up the principal stream of said river. '47 In 1845, Texas was admitted into the Union by the following Joint Resolution:
That Congress doth consent that the territory properly included within, and
rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas, may be erected into a new
State, to be called the State of Texas.... Said State to be formed, subject to the
adjustment by this government of all questions of boundary that may arise with
other governments .... 48
It was the contention of the United States that the boundaries of Texas,
being subject to adjustment, Congress was in effect refusing to recognize
the boundaries of Texas. Since the United States foreign policy at the
time of Texas's admission provided only for a three-mile seaward limit,
the boundary of Texas could not have extended beyond that three-mile
limit. The Court rejected the argument advanced by the United States,
stating that "the boundaries contemplated by the Submerged Lands Act
4-354 U.S. 515 (1957).
4, The states argued that the phrase "prior to or at the time" referred to the preadmission boundaries of the states, and therefore if the boundaries of the states were
defined to extend beyond the three-mile mark at any time prior to their admission into

the Union, they were, by virtue of the act, entitled to such boundaries.
47 1 GAIMMEL'S LAWS OF TEXAS 1193 (1836).

48 5 Stat. 797 (1845).
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are those fixed by virtue of Congressional power to admit new States,...
not by virtue of the Executive power to determine this country's obligations vis-d-vis foreign nations. ' 49 As to the status of Texas's boundary
when it entered the Union, the Coutt held that it complied with the requirements of the Submerged Lands Act. Justice Harlan stated that
when Texas was admitted into the Union, there was an utter "insensitivity" to the question of a seaward boundary. Therefore, when Congress,
in the Joint Resolution, seemingly questioned the efficacy of Texas's
boundaries, it was referring only to the land boundaries and not the seaward boundaries. Further, the Court stated that even if Texas's boundaries were not settled when Texas was admitted into the Union, Congress
thereafter impliedly consented to the seaward boundary, such implied
consent being sufficient to satisfy the act. The Court predicated this latter position (implied consent) upon a treaty entered into between the
United States and Mexico,50 and upon the fact that the two countries had
ratified it many times thereafter. 51 Article V of the treaty provided: "The
boundary line between the two Republics shall commence in the Gulf of
Mexico, three leagues from land ....-52
Because of the similarity in the claims of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama, they will be considered together. The constitutions of these
states provided that all islands lying within six leagues (three leagues in
the case of Louisiana) of the coasts of such states shall be included within
their boundaries. 53 These states argued that the boundaries established by
their constitutions should be construed to include the lands submerged
beneath the marginal sea, and not as including only the islands. The Court
held that it was obvious that these constitutions contemplated only the
islands and not the "tidelands." Therefore, the boundaries of these states
were established at three geographical miles.
The Supreme Court rendered a sepaarte decision upon Florida, whose
position differed from the other coastal states in that it asserted that its
boundaries were approved by Congress subsequent to its entry into the
Union. The Reconstruction Act of 1867 required that all states which had
seceded from the Union must submit to Congress for approval a state
constitution which complied in all respects with the exacting requirements of the act. 54 Florida, being a secessionist state, submitted such a
49 United States v. Louisiana, 80 S.Ct. 961, 990 (1960).

50 9 Star. 922 (1848).
51 E.g., 22 Star. 969 (1882); 25 Stat. 1390 (1885); 35 Star. 1863 (1905).
52 9

Stat. 922, 926 (1848).

5

3 Louisiana, 2 Star. 701 (1812); Mississippi, 3 Star. 348 (1817); Alabama, 3 Star. 489
(1819).
54

14 Star. 428 (1867).
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constitution which, in June, 1868, was approved by Congress.55 Article I
of that constitution described Florida's boundary as running from a point
in the Gulf of Mexibo three leagues from the mainland and "thence
northwestardly three leagues from the land to the next point." 56 The
Court concluded that Congress, in accepting the constitution, had performed the very act contemplated by the Submerged Lands Act and,
therefore, Florida's seaward boundary extended three marine leagues into
the sea from low-water mark.
Thus was it that the boundaries of the coastal states were not determined until June 15, 1960, more than one-hundred eighty years after the
founding of this country.
5-- 15 Stat. 73 (1868).
6 FL.A. CONST. art. 1.

THE ENIGMA OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Fourth amendment 1 protections against illegal search and seizure would
seem to be among the most ill-defined and misconstrued of the guarantees
of the Constitution interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. Up
until Elkins v. United States2 the "silver platter" doctrine proved to be a
means by which the Court allowed the fourth amendment to be a paper

protection only. By using as a basis for its decisions federal rules of evidence3 or the particular facts of the case before it,4 the Court created
confusion and contradictory decisions which existed until the Elkins rul1 The fourth amendment reads as follows: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmative and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
3E.g., Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451 (1948); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927); Silverthome Lumber v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), wherein
the Court stated: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in
a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it should not be used at all." Id. at 392.
4

E.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Go-Bart Importing v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), wherein the Court stated: "Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances." Id. at 357. Cf. Rochin v. California. 342
J.S. 165 (1952); Anello v, United States, 269 U.S, 20 (1920),

